The Fleet at Flood Tide: America's Total War in the Pacific 1944-1945 - WWII History Book for Military Enthusiasts & Students | Perfect for Research, Education & Historical Reference

Based upon my appreciation of Mr. Hornfischer’s superb Neptune’s Inferno, I pre-ordered this book as soon as I learned it was to be published. My anticipation of another thoughtful and elegant account of our Navy’s role in the defeat of Japan was not disappointed. In the interest of complete disclosure, I will say that I was taken off guard by the book’s title. I had focused on “The Fleet at Flood Tide” and was surprised to find that the book includes much information that does not relate to the to “the Fleet.” The detailed descriptions of what the Marines endured ashore in subduing the Marianas and the high drama of the flight of the Enola Gay provide an eloquent and persuasive coda to what it took to end a hopelessly savage war and avoid the more brutal “peace” that would have been the inevitable result of a longer war.Among the author’s achievements is his compelling case for the use of the atomic bomb. By 1944-45, it was clear that Japan had lost the war; yet, her leaders refused to accept reality, and many Japanese and American lives were needlessly lost. The author explains how conquest of Tinian in the Marianas and the development of the B-29 provided the means to attack the Japanese homeland regularly. The success of the Manhattan Project added a weapon so devastating that the Japanese finally acknowledged the inevitable. Mr. Hornfischer’s account of the way these momentous events played out provides some new details about how they were perceived by the Japanese that are very worthwhile. His account of the how the Japanese literally fought to the last man in the Marianas includes descriptions from the Japanese point of view that are illuminating.But what of the Fleet? The author includes a thorough description of the Battle of the Philippine Sea and its significance in the eventual defeat of Japan. He also includes some informative descriptions of how the fleet supported the landings. Later he provides a cursory treatment of Leyte Gulf and the taking of Iwo Jima and Okinawa – including the impact of the Kamikazes. Yet to be frank, I finished the book thinking that the coverage of these momentous events had been a bit slighted. I believe I understand the author’s intent to focus on the pivotal role played by the conquest of the Marianas, but on balance, I would have preferred a second volume to give these other details more attention. Mr. Hornfischer is such a good writer that a second volume would have been welcome.In a book of this breadth, a few mistakes or omissions are inevitable. I generally agreed with his portrayal of Terrible (Kelly) Turner as an irascible genius, but I think it would be fairer to fault him with oversights in the days before Pearl Harbor while he was still back in Washington rather than to blame him for the debacle at the Battle of Savo Island. In any case, I could not make sense out of his statement on p. 28 that Admiral King exonerated Turner in a letter to CNO Harold Stark. By August 1942, the date of this disaster, Betty Stark had been shunted aside to command our meager naval forces in Europe (COMNAVER), and Admiral King was clearly at the top of the Navy’s totem pole as COMINICH -- Commander in Chief, the senior uniformed officer in the Navy. Accordingly, King would not have written to Stark after Savo Island to exonerate Turner. Something is amiss here.The battleship Tennessee, even her post-Pearl Harbor modernization, had a single catapult on her somewhat narrow fantail – not two (p. 89). MacArthur was driven out of the Philippines in 1942, not 1941 (p. 330). The description of “Ultra radio transcripts” (p. 420) should have been to “Magic,” the name given to our code breaking in the Pacific. “Ultra” refers to the British breaking of the German codes. I don’t recall Nagumo ever having had battleship Nagato as his flagship (p. 492), at least during the critical moments of the War. She was Yamato’s flagship during the raid on Pearl Harbor before Yamato was commissioned. Finally, the exceptionally able gunnery enthusiast, Willis A. Lee, was a Vice Admiral, not a Rear Admiral during the periods covered in the book. If details are important enough to mention his precise rank, then they should be correct.These minor points aside, I liked Mr. Hornfischer’s description of the key commanders. Among other things, I share his admiration for Admiral Spruance and was glad to see him get the credit he is due. The plentiful and useful maps were another strength of the book. Although this was not the book I was expecting from its title, it is a very fine work of history. One of the rewarding things about reading history is to encounter a new and different perspective on events that were already familiar supported by new sources of information. Mr. Hornfischer’s book does precisely that and is very rewarding to either a generalist or a serious student.Opinions about using the atomic bomb, the attack on Pearl Harbor, comfort women, and savagery with prisoners of war will haunt any discussion of the Pacific War forever. Nevertheless, because of the way the war ended and the reconciliation that was possible after it, the United States and Japan are trusted and valued allies to this day. There are no good wars, but some wars have good endings. Mr. Hornfischer makes a persuasive case that the Pacific War was one of them.