Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan - History Book on US Military Strategy & Afghan Conflict - Perfect for Students, Historians & Political Science Enthusiasts
Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan - History Book on US Military Strategy & Afghan Conflict - Perfect for Students, Historians & Political Science Enthusiasts
Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan - History Book on US Military Strategy & Afghan Conflict - Perfect for Students, Historians & Political Science Enthusiasts

Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan - History Book on US Military Strategy & Afghan Conflict - Perfect for Students, Historians & Political Science Enthusiasts

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Description

From the award-winning author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a riveting, intimate account of America’s troubled war in Afghanistan. When President Barack Obama ordered the surge of troops and aid to Afghanistan, Washington Post correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaran followed. He found the effort sabotaged not only by Afghan and Pakistani malfeasance but by infighting and incompetence within the American government: a war cabinet arrested by vicious bickering among top national security aides; diplomats and aid workers who failed to deliver on their grand promises; generals who dispatched troops to the wrong places; and headstrong military leaders who sought a far more expansive campaign than the White House wanted. Through their bungling and quarreling, they wound up squandering the first year of the surge. Chandrasekaran explains how the United States has never understood Afghanistan—and probably never will. During the Cold War, American engineers undertook a massive development project across southern Afghanistan in an attempt to woo the country from Soviet influence. They built dams and irrigation canals, and they established a comfortable residential community known as Little America, with a Western-style school, a coed community pool, and a plush clubhouse—all of which embodied American and Afghan hopes for a bright future and a close relationship. But in the late 1970s—after growing Afghan resistance and a Communist coup—the Americans abandoned the region to warlords and poppy farmers. In one revelatory scene after another, Chandrasekaran follows American efforts to reclaim the very same territory from the Taliban. Along the way, we meet an Army general whose experience as the top military officer in charge of Iraq’s Green Zone couldn’t prepare him for the bureaucratic knots of Afghanistan, a Marine commander whose desire to charge into remote hamlets conflicted with civilian priorities, and a war-seasoned diplomat frustrated in his push for a scaled-down but long-term American commitment. Their struggles show how Obama’s hope of a good war, and the Pentagon’s desire for a resounding victory, shriveled on the arid plains of southern Afghanistan. Meticulously reported, hugely revealing, Little America is an unprecedented examination of a failing war—and an eye-opening look at the complex relationship between America and Afghanistan.

Reviews

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- Verified Buyer
Well, this certainly wasn't the most heartwarming or feel-good book I could have read with about two weeks left to go on this tour of Afghanistan. In "Little America", Chandrasekaran draws briefly on the history of (mostly counterproductive) US development assistance in Helmand as a backdrop to his examination of the US 30,000 man surge in Afghanistan over 2009-11 and the politics and strategy behind it. While most of the events he examines took place between my tours (and further south than my normal areas of interest), his description of the institutional perspectives and shortcomings that drove the USMC to fight their own private war in Helmand while British and Canadian forces tried to do too much with inadequate forces rings true. His even-handed evaluation of the tactical decision-making of BG Nicholson and other senior marines (together with the interaction between Nicholson and his senior policy advisor), together with his insight into USMC tactical operations paints a convincing picture of tactically successful (albeit expensive) activities that were, operationally, conducted in the wrong place (Helmand rather than Kandahar) and time. While he doesn't spend much time discussing tactical operations, when he does it is vivid and provided an excellent feel for the operating environment and a nuanced picture of the complexity and competing demands faced by tactical commanders - in particular, the frequent need to choose between equally unpalatable alternatives, all laden with risk and uncertainty. His brief account of the command climate within the US Army's 5/2 SBCT certainly aligns closely with what many other sources have reported - even before this Bde deployed to Kandahar, I had been told by other sources that I would hear of his Bde and it's commander for all the wrong reasons. Together with his discussions of failures in development aid and governance (both assessing the real needs and determining on how to deliver on them) I consider Chandrasekaran's discussion of the war in Southern Afghanistan to be sobering, insightful, yet even-handed and willing to put forward differing perspectives.At the strategic level, Chandrasekaran again had consulted a range of sources and conducted a lot of interviews, but I suspect he had already decided on his narrative before he started writing. His view of the differing perspectives of and tensions between key decision makers and the institutional muddle in the US Embassy and USAID offices in Kabul is illuminating and cutting, but "Little America" in these parts remind me a bit of Tom Ricks' Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005. At times Chandrasekaran appears to have relied a bit to much on the perspective of those who (1) have their own axes to grind (and perhaps to cover their own tracks - amongst a host of substantive observations were a few petty and misinformed complaints) and (2) want to tell the story that Chandrasekaran wants to tell as well. Chandrasekaran's perspective is that a COIN campaign was doomed to failure and administration critics who wanted to limit US engagement to a narrow 'counterterrorism' mission were right all along. As a consequence, we get to hear a lot first hand from critics of the surge but, with the exception of BG Nicholson in Helmand, only second-hand interpretation of the views of soldiers such as McChrystal and Petraeus's views, for example. In critiquing an enduring COIN approach, Chandrasekaran rightly points out the lack or resources and human raw material available to deliver functioning governance at district level and below. He however oscillates between approving and strongly condemning making compromises with a mix of traditional leaders and unsavory (usually overlapping) strongmen to get things done (often his approval seems based on who recommended or made the deal rather than the effect), and doesn't acknowledge the risk of limited engagement that would never produce any alternatives to these characters. While I wouldn't accuse the author of an overt partisan bias, his own preferences do color the work to an extent. If a sympathetic character is liberal leaning or an Obama supporter we get to hear a lot about it (even where the individuals politics weren't particularly relevant), but we don't hear about any competent conservatives (outside of the military) or incompetent liberals (there must have been one or two of the latter in the giant State Department/USAID machine, surely?).There is a lot to critique in how the US elected to employ the surge force in southern Afghanistan in 2009. "Little America" does make a compelling case that the available forces were allocated to the wrong priorities, and exposes a range of very real institutional and individual shortcomings and poor decisions that contributed to this state of affairs. His description of the myriad failings of development efforts and the shortcomings of Afghan capacity building are equally cutting, but I suspect that except for scale this would look like the story of many western development efforts elsewhere. While his views of the strategic debates and decision-making are informative, I do think he was inclined to apportion a bit too much blame to the soldiers and not quite enough on the administration. By deploying an inadequate surge force with imprecise direction for an insufficient period of time the President may have made a similar strategic error to the tactical errors of the British and Canadians trying to achieve too much with the 'half each way' bet of insufficient resources - but the author is content to blame McChrystal and Petraeus.Lucid, informative, and generally even-handed, "Little America" should be compulsory reading for anybody with an interest in where we are now in Afghanistan, and what to do about it. Even where I don't agree with all the authors conclusions, he makes compelling, intelligent arguments based on thorough research that are worthy of considered, serious reflection. I don't think there is a single 'one stop' book on understanding Afghanistan today, but this is a pretty good start. Don't expect to be cheered up by it, though.
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