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_After Jihad_ by Noah Feldman is focused on answering one crucial question facing American foreign policymakers today; can democracy flourish in Muslim countries?Feldman wrote that the attacks of Al-Qaeda and others are the "last, desperate gasp" of a tendency towards violence that has lost widespread support in Islamic lands. Many Muslims stand ready to embrace democracy; it is only their governments and to some extent Western policy that stands in the way. Violent jihad has failed, with revolutionary states having only been achieved in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan and the only other places where such jihadists enjoy any real popular support is in areas seen as fighting wars of liberation (such as in Chechnya and Kashmir).Washington policymakers have shied away from pressing for democratic reforms in the Muslim world for a variety of reasons, notably for a need to rely on existing Muslim allies in the war on terror, the risks of instability that democratization may pose, particularly as it might affect oil prices, and the fear that free and fair elections in several countries will bring to power violent, anti-American Islamist groups.The author argued that this sort of thinking is flawed, that support of dictators may be of benefit in the short-term but is not beneficial in the long-term. In addition, Islam and democracy are both more flexible than is generally thought; that they are what he called "mobile ideas," ideas that can appeal to and be adapted by diverse peoples living in very different countries and societies. Any fear that Islamists may rise to power is realized when those groups are repressed, as reversing the democratic success of Islamic groups in Algeria for instance produced a civil war and similar actions could serve to alienate Islamic groups in Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey, groups that worked within the system but repression of which runs the risk of turning them into a violent opposition.Feldman divided the book into three parts. In part one he sought to show how Islam and democracy are much more compatible than many think. He felt it was a false dichotomy to say that the only options in the Muslim world are either a secular state or an Islamist state; a range of options are possible; a pure Islamist state relying only on classical Islamic law is only one possibility, and even if it did rely on shari'a law could still be considered democratic if shari'a law was chosen by the majority in that country and the basic rights of non-Muslims were respected. Too often to stay in power and gain the support of secular people in their own country and of the West autocrats have emphasized that they are the only alternative to Islamist rule, and again, this is a false dichotomy. Even if Islamists do come to power there is reason to show - by the example of Iran - that many people after a few cycles of Islamic government might start to look for something more secular. Also, Islamic groups are not by definition anti-American (the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was very pro-American for instance and even Islamic groups in Turkey have been more concerned with meeting EU requirements for membership and infrastructure improvements, not exactly anti-Western activity).Potential democratic readings already exist in the Qur'an. Both Islam and democracy share a universal belief in the principle of basic human equality, a very good starting point. The first rulers of the Islamic community adopted the title "caliph" (Arabic khalifa), which means a delegate or replacement (whether for the dead Prophet or a stand-in for God), with the Qur'an strongly implying that the caliph was to be selected by the people, that the people retain some power to displace the caliph, that he governed with the consent of the Muslim community, that he administered but did not create Islamic law (and thus was bound by that same law), and he was compelled by the Qur'an to engage in consultation (shura), though admittedly the Qur'an was rather vague on the exact nature of shura.Feldman answered a number of objections to any synthesis of Islam and democracy. Among them, the necessity of the separate of church and state (there is no separation of church and state in the United Kingdom), the problem of a state-sanctioned imposition or support of Islamic values (Western governments endorse values by awarding medals, proclaiming holidays, and sponsoring the arts and have laws governing many aspects of family life; broadly this is the same as might exist in any Islamic democracy), the role of non-Muslims in a Muslim state (Jews and Christians held prominent positions in many places and eras, from Medina in the Prophet's lifetime to medieval Muslim Granada and beyond), and the harshness of punishments for hudud, crimes such as theft, which requires the thief loses his hand (in reality these punishments are rarely meted out and the standard of proof is often too high to reach; hudud standards for adultery requires four eyewitnesses in good standing of the act itself, difficult to produce).In part two, he evaluated how Islam and democracy are interacting in many nations in the Muslim world, surveying the various types of regime found in Islamic lands. For those worried that civil society - vital to democracy - does not exist in the Muslim world they need only look at the web of social services and charitable institutions provided in Egypt (and increasingly in Pakistan), not by the government but by Islamic organizations. Islam he felt was unfairly blamed for the mixed success of democracy in Pakistan; it had arguably more to do with poverty, the vast disparity of wealth, low literacy rates, a too-powerful military, and other factors.In part three Feldman argued that the United States (and the West) must change their policies towards the Muslim world, that it should encourage rather than impede democracy, that this would serve long term American interests, promote peace in the Middle East, and that it is simply the right thing to do.
